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Introduction 
The Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of  2007 (S. 
456) was introduced by Sen. Dianne Feinstein in January, 
2007, and subsequently passed the following October. 
Its companion bill, the Gang Prevention, Intervention, 
and Suppression Act (H.R. 3547), sponsored by Rep. 
Adam Schiff, has been introduced in the House. The 
bills expand the current penal code regarding criminal 
street gangs, resulting in an over-reaching defi nition of  
both gangs and gang-related crimes. Additionally, they 
create an entirely new section of  penalties pertaining to 
gang crimes, increasing the enhanced-sentences that are 
already in place. Both bills are referred to as the “Gang 
Abatement Act” in this text. However, distinction will 
be made between the Senate and House versions when 
they differ signifi cantly.
Sen. Feinstein’s and Rep. Schiff ’s legislation respond to 
an assumed rise in gang violence. The bills’ provisions 
call for suppression-heavy strategies, increasing pun-
ishments for gang crimes, and expanding the types of  
crimes that can be categorized as such. Years of  research 
and evaluation have shown that these types of  suppres-
sion strategies are not the solution to the gang problem. 
Yet, these bills propose more than $1 billion in dupli-
cative suppression, prosecution, and incarceration of  
“gangs” and “gang members,” leaving little money for 
community-based prevention and intervention programs 
that have been proven to work. Rep. Schiff ’s bill has been 
cosponsored by 25 fellow legislators. However, 8 have 
withdrawn their support due to concerns of  dispro-
portionate effects the legislation will have on youth of  
color, which will be discussed at length.
This report expresses the views of NCCD and not necessarily those of any of its partners.
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In October of  2007, Rep. Bobby Scott introduced the 
Youth PROMISE Act (H.R. 3846), a bill which proposes 
to reduce gang violence by investing in promising and 
evidence-based prevention and intervention activities in 
high-need communities. This bill has bipartisan support 
from 87 members of  Congress.
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
(NCCD) presents the following analysis of  the two ap-
proaches. We compare the Gang Abatement Act (Fein-
stein/Schiff) to the Youth PROMISE Act (Scott), focus-
ing on what research tells us about effective methods of  
reducing gang violence. 
Where’s the Fire?
Why has the federal government chosen to address gang 
violence now? Although the Gang Abatement Act states 
that violent crime rose 2.5% in 2005, the FBI’s Crime 
in the United States (CIUS) report shows that, between 
1997 and 2006, violent and property crimes have both 
decreased by nearly 23%.1 The Bureau of  Justice Statis-
tics (BJS) reports that both violent and property crime 
rates are at a 30-year low, having dropped 56% and 70%, 
respectively, since 1973.2 Moreover, gang-related violent 
crime has fl uctuated in the past ten years, and current 
fi gures are neither alarmingly high nor low. A study 
by the University of  Chicago of  violent crimes in 100 
American cities refl ects a similar trend.3 Of  the 100 cit-
ies, only 9 witnessed a rise in violent crime and in these 
9 cities, most rates are well below their historic peaks of  
the 1990s. In fact, major cities such as Los Angeles, New 
York, and Chicago were among those listed as cities 
where violent crime is decreasing. 
Defi ning “Criminal Street Gang” 
and “Gang Crime”
The following summarizes the current law, which de-
fi nes a criminal street gang as an ongoing group, club, 
organization, or association of  5 or more persons--
that has as 1 of  its primary purposes the commis-
sion of  1 or more criminal offense;
1)
the members of  which engage, or have engaged 
within the past 5 years, in a continuing series of  of-
fenses;
the activities of  which affect interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
The offenses that could be considered as gang crimes 
include:
federal felony involving a controlled substance, for 
which the maximum penalty is not less than 5 years;
federal felony crime of  violence that has as an ele-
ment the use or attempted use of  physical force 
against another person;
conspiracy to commit any of  the above offenses.
A set of  predefi ned circumstances—including the 
promotion of  the gang and prior conviction of  a gang 
crime—determine whether these offenses are gang 
related.4
Gang Abatement Act
Gang Members as Defi ned:
The Gang Abatement Act changes the current law cited 
above to require that each of  the gang members has 
committed at least one gang crime and that the group 
collectively has committed three or more gang crimes  
in the past fi ve years. Despite these restrictions on the 
number of  crimes, this modifi cation in conjunction with 
the new—and broad—defi nition of  gang crimes (dis-
cussed below), works primarily to cast a wider net over 
a large population. Though no defi nition of  gangs and 
gang crimes is widely accepted, and though defi nitions 
vary, the Offi ce of  Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJJDP) has identifi ed certain characteristics 
that are common to most gangs:5 
A self-formed group, united by mutual interests, that 
controls a particular territory, facility, or enterprise;
uses symbols in communications;
is collectively involved in crime.
Moreover, the Gang Abatement Act eliminates the fi rst 
clause of  the defi nition of  gangs, also known as the pur-
2)
3)
1)
2)
3)
1)
2)
3)
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pose clause (see above). It fails to distinguish between 
a criminal gang and a group of  individuals who have 
committed various crimes, both serious and non-seri-
ous. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, 
points out that under the proposed defi nition, a group 
of  sports coaches who have formed a betting pool could 
be deemed a gang, and each member could be convicted 
of  a gang crime and penalized under the new gang pen-
alties.6 Though cases like this are unlikely, the vagueness 
of  the bill allows for a broad application and the applica-
tion of  harsh penalties to a population surely outside of  
that intended by the bill. 
The bill’s challenge in defi ning a gang has been encoun-
tered by many, from theorists and researchers to policy 
analysts. Studies devoted entirely to defi ning gangs have 
arrived at the same conclusion as a 2001 Crime and De-
linquency article by Esbensen et al. that, 
Given the permeability of  gang membership, 
policies linking legal action to an individual’s 
perceived status may erroneously criminalize 
that individual. As such, we suggest that legisla-
tion targeting gang status should be discour-
aged in favor of  legislation focused on actual 
behavior.7
Gang Crimes as Defi ned:
Although the new defi nition of  “gang” should, theoreti-
cally, reduce the likelihood of  mistaken gang association, 
the bill’s newly defi ned set of  gang crimes is so broad 
that it would likely encompass more than the targeted 
gang population. And though the House version re-
quires that gang crimes be committed “in furtherance of  
the group,” the Senate version does not. Thus, according 
to the Senate version, it is possible for a suspected gang 
member to be convicted of  a gang crime, even if  it was 
not gang related. Moreover, gang crimes would carry 
even harsher penalties than the current ones, which will 
be discussed in the following section. The bill extends 
the defi nition of  a gang crime from violent8 and drug 
crimes to also include:
Physical force against another, burglary, arson, kid-
napping, or extortion; 
obstruction of  justice or tampering with or retaliat-
1)
2)
ing against a witness, victim, or informant; 
illegal possession of  fi rearms or explosives, rack-
eteering, money laundering, or interstate transporta-
tion of  stolen property; 
harboring illegal aliens; 
aggravated sexual abuse, exploitation, or other sex 
crime.
The logic of  classifying many of  the above crimes as 
gang related is questionable, at best. BJS reports that 
gang crimes (under the current defi nition) only account 
for 6% of  all violent crimes, and OJJDP shows that 
most of  the crimes committed by gangs are property 
crimes.9 Despite these fi ndings, the proposed legislation 
still puts a large focus on violent crimes and barely men-
tions property crimes. Moreover, newly defi ned “gang 
crimes,” such as harboring illegal aliens, do not relate 
exclusively to gangs and target more than just the gang 
population. The Gang Abatement Act is not founded 
upon evidence-based research, and NCCD questions the 
soundness of  the proposed policies.
Youth PROMISE Act
The Youth PROMISE Act does not defi ne “gang crime” 
or “gang.” Because the Act does not add or modify 
criminal penalties, it does not need defi nitions for these 
terms. However, the prevention and intervention activi-
ties funded by the act must target “youth who are at 
risk of  involvement in juvenile delinquency or street 
gang activity.” By not limiting the target population to 
youth involved in street gangs, the Youth PROMISE 
Act helps to ensure that youth who have engaged in 
any delinquent behavior will benefi t from the services 
offered. Given the diffi culties of  defi ning gang behavior, 
the focus on delinquent activity would target all youth in 
need of  services. 
Suppression vs. Prevention
Suppression tactics alone, such as gang enforcement 
teams and suppression units, have not been useful in 
deterring gang crimes. Previous efforts, like those of  
Operation Hammer and Operation Hardcore, have used 
gang enforcement teams, with the former focused on 
3)
4)
5)
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arrests and the latter on prosecution. However, neither 
showed evidence of  reducing the gang problem in Los 
Angeles.10 Despite the necessary legislation and funding, 
offi cers were poorly trained, detached from the issues, 
and uninformed on gang culture. Gang researchers Mal-
colm Klein and Irving Spergel have shown that “sup-
pression tactics intended to make youth ‘think twice’ 
about gang involvement may instead reinforce gang 
cohesion, elevating the gang’s importance and reinforc-
ing an ‘us versus them’ mentality.”11 A study by Katz and 
Webb, “Policing Gangs in America,” also found that po-
lice gang units in Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Chicago, and 
Houston often became involved in criminal misconduct 
themselves, and all units were short-lived.12 Another 
OJJDP report cites that sweeps—a popular tactic among 
gang suppression units—often resulted in the arrest of  
a large youth population.13 Many of  the arrested youth 
were not gang members, and of  those that were, very 
few had committed serious crimes. 
A summary on gangs provided by The National Crimi-
nal Justice Reference Service, which is administered by 
the Department of  Justice, noted that, “Incarceration 
does little to disrupt the violent activities of  gang-affi li-
ated inmates.”14 Furthermore, it cites a troubling statistic 
from the 2001 National Youth Gang Survey: “A large 
proportion of  these jurisdictions reported that returning 
members [from incarceration] noticeably contributed to 
an increase in violent crime (63% of  respondents) and 
drug traffi cking (68%) by local gangs.”15 In fact, studies 
demonstrate that prisons and detention centers can be 
a breeding ground for potential gang members or other 
criminal activity.16 As much as youth in the community 
form gangs for protection and “family-like relation-
ships,” incarcerated youth have an even greater need for 
protection.17 Detention does not provide the services 
individuals need in order to disassociate from gangs, 
but instead creates the conditions that make protection 
necessary.
Suppression tactics have not only been ineffective in 
reducing gang violence but also in providing the neces-
sary services to get youth back on track;18 conversely, 
prevention and intervention programs show positive 
results in both areas.19 OJJDP’s recent publication, “Best 
practices to address community gang problems: OJJDP’s 
Comprehensive Gang Model,” reveals fi ve strategies 
focused on the community. These are: 1) community 
mobilization, 2) social intervention, 3) provision of  op-
portunities, 4) organizational change and development, 
and 5) suppression. Suppression is reserved for the most 
“dangerous and infl uential gang members, removing 
them from the community.”20 A meta-analysis of  juve-
nile intervention practices found that evidence-based 
programs were more effective when implemented in 
community settings than when used in custodial set-
tings.21 Community approaches are often more effective 
because they “dig deeper into the social and everyday is-
sues that young people face, and they work on problem-
solving skills that are more applicable to life in the com-
munity.”22 By recognizing that gang affi liation is often a 
response to system failures or community dysfunction, 
the model takes a comprehensive approach to reducing 
gang violence. By identifying the needs not only of  indi-
viduals, but of  the community itself, this comprehensive 
model maximizes community resources and applies the 
best research and evidence-based policies. Comprehen-
sive programs are often the most effective in reducing 
gang violence because they address the roots of  the 
gang problem and work to reduce the delinquent behavior 
of  gang members instead of  removing the members them-
selves from the community.  
Gang Abatement Act
The Gang Abatement Act is focused mainly on suppres-
sion and enforcement tactics—increasing law enforce-
ment, prosecution capabilities, and sentence lengths. It 
does not provide communities with new strategies or 
more resources towards programs with proven effec-
tiveness in combating gang violence. Although the bill 
includes a list of  prevention and intervention strate-
gies that may be effective, they account for a minimal 
amount of  the funding. Moreover, the term “preven-
tion” is only loosely used in the bill, and many of  its 
prevention programs should actually be categorized as 
suppression policies. The “prevention” programs listed 
include: designating existing High Intensity Gang Activ-
ity Areas, establishing enforcement teams, and enhanc-
ing the investigations and prosecutions of  criminal street 
gangs. Of  the grants allocated for prevention, there is 
no requirement that these programs be promising or 
evidence-based, a discussion of  which is to follow. 
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Title I of  the proposed legislation creates an entirely 
new penal section for gang-related crimes with longer 
maximum sentences. Not only are sentences longer, but 
they are applied to a broader set of  crimes, as defi ned 
under “gang crimes.” For example, all murder offenses 
committed by a gang member would be subject to a 
sentence of  life in prison, regardless of  the nature or 
degree of  the crime. In addition to these new penalties 
for gang members, another set of  penalties, also lengthy, 
are detailed for accomplices and conspirators of  gang-
related crimes. 
The proposed legislation goes beyond the creation of  
new gang penalties and, under Title II, details further re-
forms to violent crime penalties, supposedly “in order to 
reduce gang violence.” The bill uses the relationship be-
tween gangs, drugs, and guns to justify increased penal-
ties. For example, Section 201 expands the penalties for 
all crimes, gang-related or otherwise, that are affi liated 
with drug-traffi cking crimes, and Sections 202, 203, and 
212, establish strict legislation for fi rearms possessions, 
which may or may not involve gang members. 
Drugs. The Gang Abatement Act proposes to reduce 
gang violence by offering harsher penalties for crimes 
associated with drug-traffi cking crimes. This assumes 
that, 1) drugs and gangs are related, and 2) gangs are 
responsible for the violence that results from drug-traf-
fi cking. However, only the fi rst assumption has actually 
been found to be true. Most studies show that gang 
members are more likely to be involved in drug-traf-
fi cking than nonmembers, though primarily only with 
marijuana. On the other hand, agencies mostly reported 
that gangs did not control or distribute the drugs at the 
macro-level, but participated in the distribution at the 
street-level as a way to earn a living. Even though drug 
sales and distribution are high among gangs, gang mem-
bers are not responsible for the majority of  drug crimes. 
An OJJDP bulletin quoted a Los Angeles County Dis-
trict Attorney: “…drugs and gangs are not two halves of  
the same phenomenon. Though they [drugs and gangs] 
threaten many of  the same neighborhoods, and involve 
some of  the same people, gangs and drugs must be 
treated as separate evils.”23
Guns. In an attempt to reduce gang violence, the bill 
proposes to criminalize the possession of  fi rearms if  an 
individual was previously convicted of  a gang-related 
misdemeanor or found to be in contempt of  a gang in-
junction order. Current legislation prohibits gun owner-
ship only if  one has been convicted of  a violent felony. 
The Act extends this prohibition to gang-related misde-
meanors. An individual’s right to gun ownership should 
be based on his or her own violent or criminal history, 
not on assumed social associations to an organization 
that may commit violent crimes, especially under this 
bill’s loose defi nitions of  “gang” and “gang crimes.”
Youth PROMISE Act
Rep. Scott’s Youth PROMISE Act will support evi-
dence-based and promising prevention and interven-
tion strategies proposed by communities that will come 
together through local councils. As defi ned by the Act, 
prevention efforts target youth and families who have 
not had substantial contact with the juvenile justice or 
criminal justice systems, and intervention programs tar-
get youth who are involved in, or who are identifi ed by 
evidence-based risk assessment methods as being at high 
risk of  continued involvement in juvenile delinquency 
or criminal street gangs. The Act will support effective 
programs based in the community; such programs have 
been shown to be more effective in community settings 
than in custodial settings.24 It is more effective to work 
with youth in the community, than to wait until they are 
incarcerated.
The Act also supports law enforcement efforts; each 
year, $100 million would be directed towards activities 
that promote youth-oriented policing, including the 
hiring and training of  youth-oriented offi cers. These 
offi cers would focus on community policing and work 
with community-based agencies and local coordinating 
councils. They would receive training in youth develop-
ment, systematic needs assessment, and the effectiveness 
of  evidence-based and promising practices related to 
juvenile delinquency and gang prevention and interven-
tion. Signifi cantly, the Youth PROMISE Act states that 
local communities must ensure that their proposed plans 
will not increase the number of  youth involved in the 
justice system. Allowing communities to invest in and 
work with their youth, with the collaboration of  law 
enforcement, before they are further ensnared in the 
justice system is both humane and effective. 
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An Appropriate Role for the   
Federal Government?
Gang Abatement Act 
Federalizing Crime. The Gang Abatement Act calls 
for the federalization of  certain “gang crimes,” even 
though most are certainly not of  a federal nature and 
most states already have specifi c sentencing guidelines 
for these crimes. Federalizing crimes that are not fed-
eral in nature violates both the constitutional integrity 
of  a decentralized law enforcement and separate and 
distinct federal and state judicial systems. An American 
Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Federalization 
of  Criminal Law, headed by Edwin Meese III, reports 
that federalizing crimes not only blurs the distinction 
between the role of  state and federal courts, but also 
often duplicates, and thus complicates, existing state 
laws. Indeed, most states already do have gang legisla-
tion in place and the Gang Abatement Act serves only 
to further complicate the mix of  federal and state laws. 
According to the National Youth Gang Center, all but 
eight states have some form of  gang-related legislation.25 
The result is that an individual is subject to two “ap-
preciably different” sentencing outcomes. Furthermore, 
for crimes to be federalized, there should be a “distinctly 
federal interest beyond the mere conclusion that the 
conduct should be made criminal by some appropriate 
governmental entity.”26 While many federal crimes may 
simply be symbolic, “...their presence on the books pres-
ents prosecutorial opportunities that may be exploited 
at any time in the future.”27 Most importantly, the ABA’s 
Task Force found that this kind of  federalization of  
crimes is hardly ever effective, as “federal law enforce-
ment can only reach a small percent of  such activity.”28 
Federal Suppression Efforts. Title III of  the Gang 
Abatement Act designates greater federal resources to 
deter and prevent youth from joining gangs. Yet this 
section remains suppression heavy, allocating most 
resources to the Attorney General for investigation and 
prosecution purposes. The resources allow the Attor-
ney General to designate High Intensity Gang Activity 
Areas, to hire additional personnel, to require that US 
attorneys identify, investigate, and prosecute all gangs 
in their district, and to create a National Gang Activity 
Database to further these efforts. The database, which 
would collect information on gang members, their affi li-
ations, fi rearms possessions, and criminal history, would 
be public information. Such a database would be dupli-
cative of  existing federal and state versions—yet another 
waste of  resources and taxpayer dollars. Provisions for 
prevention programs are minimal. Further, while these 
bills also support some communities’ efforts to target 
gang violence, they call for increased involvement of  
federal agencies at the local level, which would minimize 
the local investment and role in enacting policies.29 
By focusing much of  the work around the offi ce of  
the Attorney General and federal resources, the Gang 
Abatement Act reduces the signifi cance of  local agen-
cies in assessing the underlying problems that are at the 
heart of  gang violence. In fact, the enforcement teams 
created by the Attorney General’s offi ce consist mostly 
of  other federal agencies, including the FBI, the DEA, 
US Marshals, and the Department of  Homeland Secu-
rity. Perhaps of  greater concern is the creation of  the 
national gang database, as the bill does not specify how 
gang members will be identifi ed, what actions would 
lead to their inclusion, or how long they would be 
included. Many studies reveal that gang members “age 
out” and leave gangs after a year.30 In fact, it is when 
gang members try to leave gangs that such a database 
would prove most dangerous. “Gang Wars,” a publica-
tion by the Justice Policy Institute, fi nds that such label-
ing complicates an individual’s ability to leave a gang; 
they will continue to be targeted by rival gangs as well 
as rejected by society due to their label. OJJDP has also 
found that this kind of  labeling has the dual effect of  
continued rejection from social institutions and contin-
ued gang affi liation.31 As individuals are rejected due to 
their gang “status,” preventing them from integrating 
into the community, they are pushed back into gang life. 
If  youth are expected to successfully leave gang life, they 
need to be incorporated into positive social activities 
and employment opportunities. Unless federal resources 
provide comprehensive services to communities, such 
as education and employment, suppression alone will be 
ineffective in deterring and preventing gang violence. 
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Youth PROMISE Act
Under the Youth PROMISE Act, communities facing 
the greatest gang and juvenile delinquency problems 
will form local councils to develop and implement an 
effective gang prevention plan. The local council will 
include representatives from law enforcement, health 
and mental health, local schools and other city agen-
cies, court services, the business community, faith-based 
and community-based organizations, parents of  minor 
children, and youth. The councils will receive grants to 
conduct objective strengths and needs assessments of  
their communities and develop and implement compre-
hensive plans to fi ght gangs through evidence-based and 
promising prevention and intervention practices. The 
selected communities will also have the opportunity to 
learn from each other’s experiences.  
NCCD’s experience working closely with cities to de-
velop and implement comprehensive citywide plans to 
combat gang violence supports this approach. These 
cities have stressed that, though they can learn from 
each other and adopt parts of  existing approaches and 
models, it is very important that they are able to develop 
a plan that responds to their unique needs. Cities fi nd 
that plans that are developed and have the support of  a 
range of  stakeholders in the community are more likely 
to be seen as legitimate, are easier to implement, and 
are more likely to gain community support. Cities have 
called for more resources from the state and federal gov-
ernment to support their work, but have not emphasized 
increased gang enhancements or added criminal penal-
ties at the state or federal level. 
Evidence-based Practices
Evidence-based programs are important, as considerable 
funding goes to programs that have not been shown to 
be effective. In fact, studies show that few social in-
terventions, when evaluated in a scientifi cally rigorous 
manner, are found to produce signifi cant and sustained 
effects.32 To be “evidence-based,” an intervention must 
have shown positive and signifi cant results when evalu-
ated under a research design that includes a control or 
comparison group. Though random assignment is ideal, 
it is not always feasible, and in such cases a quasi-experi-
mental study with a well-matched comparison group 
may be appropriate.  
Although there are a number of  programs and interven-
tions that work, there are others that are not only expen-
sive, but have not been proven effective. Some programs 
have even been shown to increase crime. Researchers at 
the Washington State Institute for Public Policy con-
ducted a systematic review of  571 rigorous comparison-
group evaluations to identify effective crime-reduction 
approaches. Although they found a number of  effective 
programs, some programs, such as Scared Straight, actu-
ally increased criminal behavior.33 Similarly, the Surgeon 
General’s review of  the literature on youth violence 
revealed that, while some programs may be successful, 
others may not work, and others can actually be harm-
ful to youth.34 In particular, transferring youth to adult 
court has been shown to increase the criminality of  the 
youth.35
The Gang Abatement Act 
The Gang Abatement Act calls for a number of  practic-
es aimed at improving the effectiveness of  the interven-
tions it supports. Unfortunately, these practices do not 
fulfi ll the requirements of  rigorous, evidence-based re-
search. The Act requires that local collaborative groups 
set up by the Attorney General include evaluation teams 
and collect information; the Attorney General must 
report on the groups’ goals and objectives annually. 
Similarly, organizations receiving prevention grants are 
required to collect data to assess the effectiveness of  the 
crime prevention, research, and intervention activities. 
Unfortunately, the Act does not require that the activi-
ties implemented by the local collaborative groups or 
using the gang prevention grants be fully evaluated; this 
is a wasted opportunity, given that some existing pre-
vention and intervention programs have been proven 
effective, and others that are widely implemented have 
not shown any success. Further, there is no standard for 
how the activities of  the local collaborative groups and 
the organizations receiving gang prevention grants will 
assess their effectiveness. Data collection to assess the 
effectiveness of  a program is not the same as requiring 
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a rigorous, evidence-based evaluation of  a program, and 
will not help expand the nation’s understanding of  what 
works to reduce gang violence. The Act establishes a 
National Gang Research, Evaluation, and Policy Insti-
tute; however, its proposed research agenda, though 
containing worthy goals such as how to foster and maxi-
mize the impact of  the community’s moral voice, does 
not focus on proven practices. 
The Senate version of  the Gang Abatement Act pro-
poses grants to public and private entities to implement 
and rigorously evaluate innovative crime prevention 
and intervention strategies. However, this is only in the 
Senate version of  the Act and accounts for a very small 
amount of  the funding proposed under the Act.  
Youth PROMISE Act
Establishes a National Center for Proven Practices 
Research. This Center will collect and disseminate 
information to the public and the local councils 
on current research regarding evidence-based and 
promising practices related to juvenile delinquency 
and gang activity. The Center will also compile and 
share the particular programs and strategies that 
were effective in the Youth PROMISE Act commu-
nities. 
Requires that local councils partner with local re-
searchers to assess their needs and strengths, prepare 
their plans, collect data, and evaluate their progress. 
The research partners are responsible for providing 
the local councils with information on fully vetted 
and promising practices related to reducing gang 
activity and youth violence. 
Mandates that the proposed plans include a combi-
nation of  evidence-based promising prevention and 
intervention strategies that have been shown to be 
effective at reducing the rates of  juvenile delinquen-
cy and criminal street gang activity.
Lists a number of  “model” programs that may work 
well in the selected communities. Though the Youth 
PROMISE Act does not mandate that communities 
implement any specifi c programs, it does include a 
•
•
•
•
list of  suggested programs and approaches that are 
backed by rigorous research. Programs such as the 
nurse-family partnership have been shown to deter 
violence for a sustained period of  time and have 
been successfully replicated in multiple sites.36 
Provides grants to state and local law enforcement 
agencies to hire and train youth-oriented police 
offi cers; the training will cover the effectiveness of  
evidence-based and promising practices related to 
juvenile delinquency and criminal street gang pre-
vention and intervention, compared to traditional 
law enforcement. 
Establishes a Center for Youth-Oriented Policing, 
which, among other things, will develop, compile, 
and disseminate to youth-oriented police offi cers 
information about rigorous research and promising 
best practices for police to prevent and reduce juve-
nile delinquency and street gang activity. 
With respect to juvenile delinquency and criminal street 
gang activity prevention and intervention, the Youth 
PROMISE Act defi nes an evidence-based practice as a 
practice “that has statistically signifi cant juvenile de-
linquency and criminal street gang activity reduction 
outcomes when evaluated by an experimental trial, in 
which participants are randomly assigned…or a quasi-
experimental trial, in which the outcomes for partici-
pants are compared with outcomes for a control group.” 
A promising practice must have “outcomes from an 
evaluation that demonstrates that such a practice reduces 
juvenile delinquency and criminal street gang activity; 
or about which a study is being conducted to deter-
mine if  such practice is evidence-based.” Furthermore, 
the Youth PROMISE Act builds the requirement that 
the strategies be “evidence-based or promising” into 
the very defi nition of  “intervention” and “prevention” 
activities. As such, all the intervention and prevention 
activities funded by the PROMISE Act, which account 
for the bulk of  the Act’s funding, must meet the clearly 
defi ned criteria. Further, not only must grantees report 
on the effectiveness of  the prevention and intervention 
activities implemented, but they must choose to imple-
ment activities that have already been proven.
•
•
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Overrepresentation of People of 
Color in the Justice System
People of  color are heavily overrepresented in criminal 
and juvenile justice systems and in law enforcement’s 
reports of  gang membership. Beyond affecting the 
individuals incarcerated, this overrepresentation affects 
children, families, and communities of  color. Children 
suffer as they are raised without their incarcerated 
parents, and communities face gender imbalances due 
to high male incarceration rates, declining political and 
economic signifi cance, loss of  economic power, and 
high rates of  felony disenfranchisement.37 
According to BJS, African Americans represented ap-
proximately 900,000 of  the nation’s 2.3 million inmates 
held in state or federal prison or in local jails in midyear 
2007.38 African American males were incarcerated at six 
times the rate of  White males, and Latino males were 
incarcerated at over two times the rate of  White males.39 
Men of  color of  particular age groups are particularly 
vulnerable; one in nine African American men between 
30 and 34 years of  age is incarcerated.40 Women of  color 
are also substantially overrepresented; African American 
women were incarcerated at 3.7 times the rate of  White 
women, and Latina women were incarcerated at 1.5 
times the rate of  White women.41 If  current incarcera-
tion rates remain the same, BJS predicts that approxi-
mately one in three (32.2%) African American males, 
one in six Latino males (17.2%), and one in 17 White 
(5.9%) males will go to prison during their lifetime.42 
Though females are expected to go to prison at much 
lower rates than males, women of  color are similarly 
overrepresented compared to Whites in forecasted 
prison rates. African American females are expected to 
have a one in 18 chance (5.6%), Latina females to have a 
one in 45 chance (2.2%) and White females a one in 110 
chance (0.9%) of  ever going to prison.43  
Studies show that not only are people of  color over-
represented in the juvenile and criminal justice systems, 
but this overrepresentation often increases as individu-
als move through the stages of  the justice system. In a 
meta-analysis of  34 studies on race and the juvenile jus-
tice system, researchers found that about two-thirds of  
the studies of  disproportionate minority contact (DMC) 
showed negative “race effects” at one stage or another 
of  the juvenile justice process.44 NCCD’s study of  youth 
in the juvenile justice system revealed that youth of  
color, especially African American youth, are increas-
ingly overrepresented as they move through the juvenile 
justice system.45 That is true even when White youth and 
youth of  color are charged with similar offenses. For 
example, while African American youth represent only 
16% of  the population, they are: 
28% of  juvenile arrests,
30% of  referrals to juvenile court,
34% of  youth formally processed by the juvenile 
court,
35% of  youth judicially waived to criminal court,
38% of  youth in residential placement, and
58% of  youth admitted to state adult prison.
People of  color are particularly vulnerable to being 
classifi ed as gang members. The National Youth Gang 
Center conducted an annual survey of  a nationally rep-
resentative sample of  law enforcement agencies serving 
larger cities, suburban counties, smaller cities, and rural 
counties since 1996. The latest fi gures, which average 
the results from 2001 through 2004, showed that law 
enforcement agencies reported gang members as be-
ing 35.7% African American, 48.2% Latino, and 9.5% 
White.46 Similarly, a 1992 survey of  police departments 
in 79 larger cities and 43 smaller cities found that the 
departments reported gang members as being predomi-
nantly African American (48%) and Latino (43%).47 In 
both these samples, White gang members account for 
less than 10% of  total gang members. Indeed, research 
shows that gang units are more likely to be formed in 
cities with larger Latino populations.48
By contrast, youth surveys reveal much higher rates of  
White participation in gangs. The National Longitudinal 
Survey of  Youth (NLSY) gathered data from a nation-
ally representative sample of  9,000 youth between the 
ages of  12 and 16 at year end, 1996. Of  youth who 
reported gang involvement in the previous 12 months, 
42% were White, 27% African American, and 24% 
Latino.49 The national evaluation of  the Gang Resistance 
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
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Education and Training (GREAT) program incorporat-
ed a survey of  8th grade students in 42 schools located 
in 11 cities across the country. Judith Greene and Kevin 
Pranis found that by applying the prevalence rates in the 
GREAT sample to the US population, they produced a 
similar breakdown as the NLSY data: 46% White, 22% 
African American, and 25% Latino.50 
It is very diffi cult to reconcile the differences in racial 
and ethnic composition reported in law enforcement 
and youth surveys. The differences do not seem to be 
due to a difference in the seriousness of  that youth’s 
gang involvement or delinquent behavior. Gang-in-
volved youth of  all races report similar rates of  delin-
quent behavior, including crime against persons, prop-
erty crime, drug use, and drug sales.51 When researchers 
employed more stringent defi nitions of  gangs to try to 
account for some of  the difference, including a formal 
gang structure and specifi c delinquent behavior, the eth-
nic/racial breakdown of  youth that self-report as gang 
members did not change.52 
There are a variety of  reasons that youth surveys may 
report larger portions of  White youth than law enforce-
ment surveys, among them: suburban, small-town, and 
rural law enforcement agencies, where White gang youth 
are more likely to be active, may be less capable of  track-
ing gang members than urban police agencies, urban po-
lice departments are more likely to use gang databases, 
which often do not have a process for removing youth 
from the gang list once their time with the gang has 
ceased, and law enforcement is trained to identify gang 
members as youth of  color.53 There are also several pos-
sible explanations for the overrepresentation of  people 
of  color in the justice system including increased polic-
ing in communities of  color, the socioeconomic status 
of  people of  color and thus, their reliance on the public 
defense system, and sentencing laws that disproportion-
ately affect them.54
Gang Abatement Act
Despite the widely acknowledged overrepresentation of  
people of  color in the justice system, and law enforce-
ment’s tendency to assume that gang youth are youth 
of  color, the Gang Abatement Act does not include 
any protections to minimize the disproportionate racial 
and ethnic impact of  their proposed enforcement and 
suppression policies. Of  particular concern is that the 
defi nition proposed is so broad that it will likely have 
the effect of  targeting individuals of  color, regardless of  
gang membership. The US Sentencing Commission re-
ports that, in 2006, African Americans and Latinos made 
up approximately 70% of  defendants convicted under 
code sections to be further “enhanced” by the Gang 
Abatement Act.55 This new proposal reverses much of  
the progress already made in the area of  juvenile justice. 
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJ-
DPA)—originally passed in 1974, reauthorized in 2002, 
and currently in the process of  another reauthoriza-
tion—addresses several key issues, such as the overrepre-
sentation of  youth of  color in the justice system (DMC) 
and the detrimental effects of  incarcerating youth in 
adult prisons. The Act takes appropriate steps to require 
that, when possible, juveniles are treated separately from 
the adult criminal justice system and that states address 
the issues of  DMC within their jurisdiction. The Gang 
Abatement Act runs counter to these mandates, address-
ing neither the effects of  the legislation on the juvenile 
population nor on the problem of  DMC. 
The federal government has long recognized the im-
portance of  race and ethnicity in the administration of  
justice in this country; in 1988 the JJDPA was amended 
to require that states participating in formula grant 
programs determine if  DMC exists and, if  so, to demon-
strate efforts to reduce it. It has been made clear that law 
enforcement agencies identify gang members as youth 
of  color, and that race and ethnicity are central to un-
derstanding the experiences of  individuals in the justice 
system. Last year, partly in response to the concerns of  
the racial disparity created by the difference in sentenc-
ing between crack and powder cocaine, the US Sentenc-
ing Commission lowered its sentencing guidelines for 
crack cocaine offenses. Two states, Connecticut and 
Iowa, now require that racial impact sentence statements 
be prepared for new proposed sentencing legislation. 
These statements should speak to the lack of  consider-
ation this bill places on certain racial populations and to 
the likely consequences. In a justice system that is already 
facing such racial disparities, these strategies promise 
to alleviate many of  the unintended disparities prior to 
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adoption of  new policies, rather than waiting until after 
the problems of  DMC arise. It is particularly disappoint-
ing that the Act disregards the importance of  race in the 
administration of  justice, especially given the steps that 
the federal government has already taken to minimize 
these effects.
Youth PROMISE Act
The Youth PROMISE Act ensures that its proposed 
policies do not increase the number of  youth of  color 
in the justice system, and aims to alleviate some of  the 
overrepresentation of  these youth. In particular, lo-
cal communities must ensure that their proposed plans 
will not increase the number of  youth involved in the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems. Furthermore, the 
Youth PROMISE Act aims to reduce the overrepresen-
tation of  people of  color by requiring that communi-
ties’ proposed plans take into account the cultural and 
linguistic needs of  the community and include strategies 
to improve indigent defense delivery systems, particu-
larly for youth overrepresented in the justice system. 
The Youth PROMISE Act funds prevention and inter-
vention programs proposed by communities; the com-
munities with the highest concentration of  youth, who 
are at risk of  involvement or already involved in juvenile 
delinquency or criminal street gang activity, will be fund-
ed. Because people of  color are more likely to rely on 
the public defense system, to live in communities with 
higher levels of  juvenile delinquency and street gang 
activity, and to have limited positive activities for youth, 
they are likely to benefi t from these considerations.56
Special Needs of Youth
A large portion of  gang members are under 18 years 
of  age. According to the National Youth Gang Survey, 
youth under 18 years of  age represented 37% of  the 
individuals identifi ed by law enforcement as gang mem-
bers.57 Researchers report that the typical age range for 
gang members is 12 to 2458 and that the initial entry into 
gangs is around 11 years of  age.59
Studies have shown that youth lack some of  the capa-
bilities that are relevant to establishing culpability. Psy-
chosocial studies fi nd that adolescents tend to employ 
short-sighted decision-making, poor impulse control, 
and vulnerability to peer pressure.60 Neuroscientists 
have found that the adolescent frontal lobe has different 
quantities and types of  cell matter as that of  the adult 
brain; the frontal lobe is linked to long-term planning, 
ability to regulate aggression, and possibly moral judg-
ment.61 In 2005, the US Supreme Court abolished the 
death penalty for juveniles who were below the age of  
18 when they committed their offense; arguing that 
“juveniles’ susceptibility to immature and irresponsible 
behavior” means their conduct is not as “morally repre-
hensible” as that of  an adult.62 Further, as youth grow 
older, they tend to “age out” of  delinquent behavior; 
harsh sentences and the gang member label may make 
it diffi cult for them to successfully reintegrate into 
society.63 Studies have shown that youth can be very 
negatively impacted by incarceration and tough sentenc-
ing; youth seem to be particularly vulnerable and have 
particularly negative outcomes, when housed with adult 
criminals or when treated as adults in the criminal justice 
system. The Task Force on Community Preventive Ser-
vices found that youth transferred to the adult criminal 
justice system were more likely to be re-arrested for a 
violent or other crime than comparable young offenders 
not transferred.64 Youth in adult facilities are vulnerable 
to physical and sexual assault, the infl uence of  negative 
“role models,” limited educational and rehabilitation op-
portunities, inappropriate supervision, and suicide.65 
Gang Abatement Act
The Gang Abatement Act does not adequately account 
for the special needs of  youth; this is particularly impor-
tant as it calls for severe penalties, including life without 
parole, for all age groups. The bill does call for the US 
Sentencing Commission to examine the appropriateness 
of  sentences for minors in the federal system, including 
the appropriateness of  life sentences without possibil-
ity for parole for minor offenders. Unfortunately, this 
study will not be completed until a year after the enact-
ment of  the Act’s provisions. It seems that given the 
extensive and growing knowledge of  the developmental 
needs of  youth, and the lack of  a juvenile system at the 
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federal level, juveniles should not be subjected to the 
criminal penalties under the bill until the proposed study 
has been completed. Further, existing evidence—as well 
as US obligations under international law—suggests 
that life without the possibility of  parole should not be 
considered for those who committed their crime before 
turning 18 years of  age. 
The Youth PROMISE Act
The Youth PROMISE Act funds several activities 
that aim to ensure that law enforcement and a 
community’s response to gang violence take into 
account the special needs of  youth and the special 
vulnerability of  youth in incarceration. The Act:
Requires that each community’s PROMISE 
plan provides for the training of  prosecutors, 
defenders, probation offi cers, judges, and other 
court personnel on issues concerning the de-
velopmental needs, challenges, and innovative 
opportunities for working with youth in the 
juvenile justice system. 
Requires that each community’s PROMISE 
plan ensures the number of  youth involved in the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems do not increase 
as a result of  the activities undertaken with the funds 
provided. 
Requires that each community’s PROMISE council 
includes at least two parents of  minor children, and 
two local youth between the ages of  15 and 24. 
Establishes a center for Youth-Oriented Policing to 
develop a model training program that emphasizes 
youth development and evidence-based and prom-
ising practices related to juvenile delinquency and 
criminal street gang activity. 
Provides for the hiring and training of  youth-ori-
ented police offi cers who will work with PROMISE 
coordinating councils and community-based organi-
zations. These offi cers will be trained to work with 
the community and to understand the developmen-
tal needs of  youth. 
•
•
•
•
•
By ensuring that those in law enforcement and court 
services are aware of  the needs of  youth, that youth 
are not more likely to enter into the juvenile or criminal 
justice system as a result of  the community-based poli-
cies enacted, and by including youth and their families 
in composing the communities’ response to youth, the 
Youth PROMISE Act promotes a community response 
to youth that takes into account their special needs and 
vulnerabilities.  
Fiscal Analysis
Title III of  the Gang Abatement Act is designated as “In-
creased Federal Resources to Deter and Prevent Seriously 
At-Risk Youth from Joining Illegal Street Gangs and for 
Other Purposes.” Although the bill refers to the authori-
zation of  funds for “prevention,” a closer reading reveals 
that a large portion of  the money is actually reserved for 
law enforcement and prosecution—categories that fall 
under suppression. 
The Congressional Budget Offi ce estimates that the 
implementation of  the Senate version of  this bill would 
cost $1.1 billion over the 2008-2012 fi scal period, with 
about $125 million appropriated annually for suppres-
sion and less than $45 million reserved for prevention.66 
This CBO estimate does not factor in the costs of  sev-
eral important consequences of  the bill—an increased 
number of  prosecutions, convictions, and longer sen-
Gang Abatement Act Proposed Spending
*A small, undefined 
portion of enforcement 
funds will also be directed 
towards prosecution 
efforts.
   Enforcement* = $85 million
   Prosecution = $20 million
   Investigations = $20 million
Gang Prevention Programs 
= $40 million
Youth Violence Prevention 
= $4.8 million
Suppression
Prevention
$125 million
$45 million
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tences. Though it is diffi cult to forecast the additional 
number of  individuals incarcerated due to this legisla-
tion, it is suffi cient to say that there will be additional 
costs incurred besides the $1.1 billion appropriated. For 
example, the federal judiciary estimates that, in FY 2007, 
it cost nearly $25,000 to incarcerate a single person in 
federal prisons.67 With more people in prison for longer 
periods, annual federal costs to incarcerate will easily 
surpass the current expenditure of  $49 billion. 
Such an allocation of  resources is contrary to research 
that shows that suppression efforts are often perceived 
to be the least effective of  all methods, while preven-
tion has been more useful in reducing gang violence. 
OJJDP’s Comprehensive Gang Models, for example, stresses 
community mobilization, employment and educational 
opportunities, and social interventions before suppres-
sion strategies. Other evidence-based practices such as 
multisystemic therapy offer intensive services, counsel-
ing, and training, and have produced positive results. 
Studies have found that treatment and prevention 
programs show a greater return on each dollar invested 
than incarceration. A report by the Surgeon General that 
reviewed existing studies on ways to reduce youth vio-
lence concluded that “prevention is truly more cost-ef-
fective in the long run that incarceration.”68 The Justice 
Policy Institute fi nds that incarceration yields $0.37 per 
dollar spent in reduced crime and public safety benefi ts 
to society, whereas treatment and prevention efforts 
yield over $18.00 in return per dollar spent, a fi gure cited 
by the US Conference of  Mayors in their 2008 Com-
prehensive Gang Abatement Legislation.69 The savings 
to be realized in prevention efforts represent savings 
not only in justice and welfare costs, but also savings to 
victims and the added productivity of  saved youth.
The Youth PROMISE Act proposes to spend approxi-
mately $10 billion in the 2009-2013 fi scal period. While 
the Youth PROMISE Act contains larger initial costs, 
several factors must be considered. First, the Act is an 
investment in all youth, whether low-risk, at-risk, or 
high-risk, providing them with the resources needed to 
stay away from crime and build healthy and promising 
lives. Second, research has shown that prevention and 
intervention programs such as those advocated for in 
this Act show a return on investment over time. A study 
by the Penn State Prevention Research Center shows 
that prevention programs that have proven effective in 
Pennsylvania “...not only pay for themselves but also 
represent a potential $317 million return to the Com-
monwealth.”70 Similar studies by the Washington State 
Institute on Public Policy, the Justice Policy Institute, 
and the RAND Corporation have shown the same 
results.71 
Both bills have signifi cant long-term fi scal impacts that 
must be considered. While the Gang Abatement Act 
would grow in costs over time, the Youth Promise Act 
would not only recover its initial cost but also see sav-
ings grow from the investment. 
Conclusion
Research and NCCD’s experiences strongly favor the 
practices promoted in the Youth PROMISE Act. The 
Gang Abatement Act relies on strategies that have been 
used repeatedly in the past decades, only to yield the 
results of  overcrowded prisons and a punitive culture 
in which our youth are being sent to correctional facili-
ties not equipped to address their developmental needs. 
Such strategies are ineffective and costly, and reverse the 
progress the nation has already made in terms of  juve-
nile justice and overrepresentation of  people of  color 
within the justice system. The Youth PROMISE Act 
appropriately rejects these failed policies, and embraces 
what years of  research and practice have proven—that 
with the right programs, our youth can not only stay out 
of  trouble but also have promising futures. 
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